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INTERIM MEASURES IN INTER-STATE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: UKRAINE V. RUSSIA
Dr. Stefan Kirchner
“Does no one remember the former Yugoslavia? Using principles
of self-determination to justify ethnic homogeneity has resulted in
ethnic cleansing. This brand of nationalism carried to its logical
conclusion is ugly, plain and simple.”1
ABSTRACT: Over the course of the year 2014, the situation in
Ukraine has turned from a domestic political issue involving protests,
killings, and the ouster of the former president, into a military
confrontation with Russia. At the time of writing (August 2014),
Russia has annexed Crimea and is supporting separatists, who are in a
state of civil war against the Ukrainian state, in Eastern parts of the
country. This conflict is ongoing and an unknown number of civilians
have been killed, notably the passengers of the Malaysia Airlines flight
MH17, which is thought to have been shot down over the conflict zone.
Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have become refugees, the
majority being internally displaced persons, many also fleeing into
Russia. Both Ukraine and Russia are parties to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition to the individual
complaints procedure, the European Convention on Human Rights
allows for inter-state complaints. Ukraine has already used this
procedural possibility, in the Crimea takeover in March 2014, to bring
Russia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). While
rarely utilized, this procedure has been employed by states to protect
specific rights of citizens, or deal with a conflict with other states. In
particular, in the absence of jurisdiction by, for example, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ECtHR is a forum which can
be reached immediately so long as parties to the ECHR are involved.

1.

Lea Brilmayer, Why the Crimean Referendum is Illegal, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/14/crimean-referendumillegal-international-law.
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This article analyzes the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights in inter-state complaints pertaining to armed conflicts and
situations of occupation. It will be shown that, although the conflict is
still ongoing and the situation could be considered political in nature,
there are indeed legal grievances for which the ECtHR is the right
forum. In addition, the applicability of the ECHR to situations of
armed conflict will be investigated. While the case between Ukraine
and Russia is still pending before the ECtHR, the Court has already
issued interim measures. While the European Court of Human Rights
usually enjoys a very high rate of compliance, the question is if the
current obvious non-compliance by both parties threatens to
undermine the persuasive power of the ECtHR.
AUTHOR: Dr. Stefan Kirchner, MJI, is admitted to the bar in
Germany (Rechtsanwalt) and specializes in procedures before the
European Court of Human Rights. He is Associate Professor for
Fundamental and Human Rights with special focus on indigenous
rights at the University of Lapland, a former Assistant Professor at
Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania (academic year
2013-2014), has taught European Human Rights Law at Taras
Shevchenko University in Kyiv and has been invited to teach at V. N.
Karazin Universitv in Kharkiv, Ukraine, in the academic year 20142015. In addition, he is co-chair of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
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INTERIM MEASURES IN INTER-STATE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: UKRAINE V. RUSSIA
Dr. Stefan Kirchner
I.

INTRODUCTION

In March 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian territories of
Crimea and Sevastopol after (initially unidentified) gunmen had taken
over the area2 and after a referendum (the democratic nature3 and
legality of which, under international law,4 have been contested) had
allegedly shown a majority vote for independence from Ukraine.
Russian forces took over Crimea in response to what Vladimir Putin
referred to as “uncontrolled crime spreading to the eastern region of
the country,”5 which culminated in the annexation on March 18, 2014,6
and which is seen by Russia as a “reunification.”7

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east26248275 (last updated Nov. 13, 2014).
Brilmayer, supra note 1.
Crimea Result Makes “a Mockery” of Democracy, Says Hague, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26606556 (last updated Mar. 16, 2014).
Chrisella Herzog, Political Legitimacy and International Law in Crimea: Pushing the
U.S. and Russia Apart, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (May 8, 2014),
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/politics/2187-political-legitimacy-andinternational-law-in-crimea-pushing-the-u-s-and-russia-apart.
Shaun Walker & Ian Trayner, Putin Confirms Crimea Annexation as Ukraine Soldier
Becomes First Casualty, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 19, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/putin-confirms-annexation-crimeaukrainian-soldier-casualty.
Herzog, supra note 5.
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Crimea, which is also home to a small minority of predominantly
Jewish Karaims,8 was known as Taurica in antiquity9 and has been
ruled by Greeks, Romans, Goths, Mongols and Byzantium.10
Geographically, the term “Crimea” refers to the peninsula as a whole.
From a political Ukrainian perspective, it consists of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea (which already enjoys more autonomy than
Ukraine’s regions or oblasts) and the city of Sevastopol, which, like
the capitol Kyiv, enjoys special status in Ukrainian law. Both the
autonomous province of Crimea and the special status city of
Sevastopol were included in the self-proclaimed “Republic of
Crimea,” which then sought admission to the Russian Federation.
From a Russian point of view, the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea is now one of the Federal Subjects of the Russian Federation.
Russia consists not of states but of Federal Subjects that may have
different designations, such as republics, provinces, districts or
territories. The latter is similar to the organized incorporated territories
in the United States, although all Russian Federal Subjects are legally
equal under Russian Constitutional Law. Sevastopol is considered by
the Russian government to be one of three Federal Cities of Russia,
like Moscow and St. Petersburg. All Federal Cities are also Federal
Subjects under Russian law, unlike Washington D.C. in the United
States, but similar to the status of the city-states of Berlin, Hamburg,
and Bremen in Germany. By designating the Crimea and Sevastopol
in accordance with terminology already used to describe Russia’s
administrative subdivisions, the Russian government has made it clear
that it not only intends to occupy, but to annex these areas into Russia.
These steps can be seen as an attempt to take back at least some of the
territory lost when the Soviet Union (USSR), which was heavily
dominated by Russia, fell apart, which has also raised concern over
Russia’s ambitions among other European states.
8.

9.

10.

Paul Goble, The Karaims - Another Forgotten People of Crimea Now at Risk,
INTERPRETER MAG. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/the-karaimsanother-forgotten-people-of-crimea-now-at-risk/.
Adam Taylor, To Understand Crimea, Take a Look Back at its Complicated History,
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understandcrimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/.
Id.
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An allegedly independent “Republic of Crimea,” comprised of
Crimea and Sevastopol,11 was declared by so-called local separatists
but not recognized by any state. The new “Republic” was short lived,
as its main political activity consisted of asking Russia to incorporate
it into the Russian Federation.12 Since the incorporation on March 18,
2014, Russia considers Crimea and Sevastopol to have been reunified
with the rodina, the motherland. The German word “Anschluss” has
been used to describe the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by
Russia.13 The term commonly refers to the annexation of Austria into
Germany on March 12, 1938. The use of the term anschluss to
describe recent events in Crimea and Sevastopol, however, can
disguise that there might be stronger similarity to the annexation of the
Sudentenland by Germany in late 1938. The annexation of the
Sudentenland was based on claims that Germany was protecting ethnic
Germans in Czechoslovakia. This was a precursor for the invasion of
the remainder of Czechoslovakia the following year. While history is
not a necessary predictor of future events, the historic parallels are
troubling. The annexation of Crimea has been followed by an ongoing
armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which seems to follow the same
pattern of covert operations seen in Crimea, though on a whole new
level.
While Eastern and Southern Ukraine are now referred to as “New
Russia,” Crimea and Sevastopol have a stronger cultural and historical
bond with Russia. Crimea had been a part of Russia since 1783, but
was given by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to
Ukraine in 1954, when both Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet
Union. Since the Soviet Union was dominated by Russia, the transfer
was perceived as symbolic, but also aimed at buying Ukrainian

11.
12.

13.

Autonomous Republic of Crimea: Information Sheet, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF UKR., available at http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/info/regions/1-crimea.
Pro-Russian Leader Asks Putin for Help, CBS NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/crimeas-leader-claims-control-asks-russias-vladimirputin-for-help/.
George Packer, Terms of Crisis, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/31/terms-of-crisis; Catherine A.
Fitzpatrick, Russia This Week: Is the Crimean Annexation Putin’s Anschluss?, THE
INTERPRETER (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-hatecampaigns-against-anti-war-critics/.
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compliance with the Soviet regime in the wake of the Holodomor, the
starvation of millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s. Among many
Russians, however, the idea persisted that Crimea and Sevastopol were
part of Russia. The port of Sevastopol has long been of enormous
strategic importance for Russia and was the home base of Russia’s
Black Sea Fleet even after Ukrainian independence in 1991. Crimea’s
strategic location allows control over the Black Sea and consequently
is vital for securing Russia’s access to the Mediterranean Sea,14 which
was already an issue in the nineteenth-century.
Crimea is no stranger to armed conflict: the Crimean War (18541856) pitted Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire against Russia.15
This conflict concerned blocking Russia’s advances16 towards the
Danube River17 and the Mediterranean Sea.18 Accordingly, the conflict
was restricted to the region,19 although there were some British efforts
to blockade Russian ports in the Baltic Sea.20 The Crimean War was a
financial disaster for the Ottoman Empire.21 Faced with interest rates
of up to 30% per year,22 as late the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire had to
use two-thirds of the state’s income just to service the debt incurred in
financing the war.23
In 1944, the Crimean Tatars suffered nearly complete ethnic
cleansing when 200,000 Crimean Tatars were deported by Stalin. 24

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Robert Orr, Why Crimea Matters to Russia, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:22 PM),
http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/03/why-crimea-matters-to-russia/; Caroline
Mortimer, Ukraine Crisis: Why Is Crimea So Important to Russia?, THE INDEP. (Mar.
3, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-why-iscrimea-so-important-to-russia-9166447.html.
John Darwin, DER IMPERIALE TRAUM - DIE GLOBALGESCHICHTE GROSSER REICHE
1400-2000, 216 (2010).
William Woodruff, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 168 (Little Brown
Book Grp. 2005) (1991).
Cf. Id. at 74.
Cf. Id.
Darwin, supra note 15, at 216.
Darwin, supra note 15, at 216.
Darwin, supra note 15, at 275.
Darwin, supra note 15, at 276.
Darwin, supra note 15, at 275 et seq.
Tony Barber, Crimea: A Region Divided, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:58 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3d3e3e4-a473-11e3-9cb0-00144feab7de.html#slide0.
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Seventy to ninety thousand were killed or died in the process.25 They
were resettled after the end of World War II.26 Ten years later,
Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine,27 ostensibly
to placate the Ukrainians over the Holodomor.28 Around 80% of the
population of Crimea are ethnic Russians or speak Russian;29 13% are
Crimean Tatars.30 During the Soviet era this seemed to be of little
consequence,31 but when Ukraine became independent in 1991,
“Crimea [turned], virtually overnight, from a largely Russianpopulated bastion of Soviet naval might into the most ethnically and
politically contested region of [the] newly independent Ukrainian
state.”32
There had been tensions in Crimea prior to Russia’s invasion, 33
but these were by no means so severe as to suggest military action.
The close cultural and historic ties between Crimea, Sevastopol, and
Russia also do not justify annexation by Russia. Throughout European
history borders have been redrawn many times, and the idea that states’
borders should be equal to ethnic home areas harkens back to the
darkest horrors of war. After World War II and the Cold War, Europe
came together in peace and cooperation, with respect for human rights
and the rule of law. It seems as if Moscow is sacrificing this consensus
in favor of regaining the standing it enjoyed on the international stage
before the end of the Soviet Union.
Despite Russia’s initial claim that the unidentified soldiers that
took control of Crimea in the spring of 2014 were Crimean self-defense
forces,34 rather than forces of the Russian Federation, they were later

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
J. Otto Pohl, The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars, INT’L COMMITTEE FOR
CRIMEA (2000), http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html.
Barber, supra note 24.
Barber, supra note 24.
Barber, supra note 24.
Barber, supra note 24.
Barber, supra note 24.
Barber, supra note 24.
Barber, supra note 24.
Bill Chappell & Mark Memmott, Putin Says Those Aren’t Russian Forces in Crimea,
NPR (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea.
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confirmed to be Russian.35 As will be shown, Russia is responsible for
the ongoing human rights violations by these forces in the disputed
peninsula. These violations include not only violence and threats
against Ukrainians, but also attacks against journalists and threats of
ethnic cleansing.36 The announcement on March 19, 2014 that some
Crimean Tatars would have to leave their homes in order to
accommodate the “social needs”37 of ethnic Russians,38 came just one
day after President Putin had declared that Tatar would become the
third official language, along with Russian and Ukrainian, in Crimea.39
If accurate, this report raises serious human rights concerns. Already
since the early days of the crisis, the work of journalists in Crimea has
been subject to severe limitations,40 which include the use of violence
by pro-Russian forces against reporters addressing the situation there.41
In the summer of 2014, the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol has
been stabilized upon incorporation into the Russian Federation,
although done in violation of international law and of Ukraine’s
sovereignty. In the meantime, Russia has built up a large number of
forces at the border of Ukraine and continues to support armed forces
that fight a war against the Ukrainian government in the eastern
provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk, both of which have declared their
35.
36.

37.

38.
39.

40.

41.

Russian Invasion of Ukraine, UKR. POLICY (Feb. 27, 2014),
http://ukrainianpolicy.com/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/.
Andrew Korybko, Ethnic and Cultural Cleansing in Ukraine, GLOBAL RESEARCH
(June 18, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/ethnic-and-cultural-cleansing-inukraine/5387539.
Mary Chastain, Crimean Government Tells Tatars to Leave Their Lands,
BREITBART.COM (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/BigPeace/2014/03/19/Crimean-Government-Tells-Tatars-to-Leave-Their-Lands; Crimean
Tatars Call on International Community to Support Their Right to Self-Determination,
UNPO (May 8, 2014), http://www.unpo.org/article/16898.
Id.
Alice Speri, Crimean Tatars Hardly Reassured by Putin’s Promise of Inclusion, VICE
NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/crimean-tatars-hardly-reassuredby-putin-s-promises-of-inclusion.
Nicholas Williams, Blunt instruments: Media repression in the Ukraine crisis, INDEX
ON CENSORSHIP (June 25, 2014), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/06/bluntinstruments-media-repression-ukraine-crisis/.
See Antonia Molloy, Ukraine crisis: Ukrainian journalist being held by pro-Russian
separatists is accused of ‘war crimes’, THE INDEPENDENT, (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-ukrainian-journalistbeing-held-by-prorussian-separatists-is-accused-of-war-crimes-9273291.html.
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independence from Ukraine.42 These battles have led to hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainians fleeing their homes as well as to an unknown
number of civilian deaths.43 The conflict gained global attention with
the shooting down of a civilian airliner, Malaysian Airlines flight
MH17, which flew over Ukraine during a flight from Amsterdam to
Kuala Lumpur.44 Russia is suspected of not only training and
supplying separatist forces fighting in eastern Ukraine but also of
direct combat activities against Ukraine in Ukrainian territory. It
appears that the goal of the current Russian government is not simply
the annexation of Ukraine, but rather, to turn Ukraine into a failed
state.45
This strategy is similar to the 2008 war against Georgia and the
continuing situation in Moldova, to use the creation of self-proclaimed
independent ‘states,’ which lack international recognition, to
destabilize the original country to the point at which further integration
into either the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) becomes impossible.46 In addition, references
to parts of Ukraine as “New Russia,” a historic term which dates back
to Catherine the Great, have raised fears that larger parts of Eastern
and Southern Ukraine could share Crimea’s fate.47 In late August
2014, Russian or Russian-supported forces have crossed into Southeast
42.

43.

44.

45.

46.
47.

Stephen Lendman, Lugansk and Donetsk Declare Independence, STEVE LENDMAN
BLOG (May 12, 2014), http://sjlendman.blogspot.ch/2014/05/lugansk-and-donetskdeclare-independence.html.
Ukraine: UN report shows rising civilian deaths, ongoing rights abuses, UN NEWS
CENTRE, (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48588#.VAiwwMbSSQo.
Agencies, MH17 crash: Shooting down the Malaysia Airlines Airlines flight ‘may
amount to a war crime’, says UN, THE TELEGRAPH, (July 28, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10995087/MH17-crashShooting-down-the-Malaysia-Airlines-flight-may-amount-to-a-war-crime-saysUN.html.
Sergey Aleksashenko, Ukraine is Failing as a State, THE MOSCOW TIMES, (Dec. 13,
2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ukraine-is-failing-as-astate/491462.html.
Pro-Russian opposition in Moldova spreads anti-EU myths to destabilize situation,
IPN (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.ipn.md/en/politica/63829.
Max Fisher, The very scary word in Putin’s new statement on the Ukraine Crisis, VOX
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/28/6080589/putin-ukraines-rebelsnovorossiya.
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Ukraine near Mariupol,48 and a geographical valuation makes it clear
that it is possible that these forces will attempt to create a land
connection from Russia proper to occupied Crimea.
In August 2014, NATO estimated that approximately 1,000
members of the Russian armed forces were involved in the fighting in
Ukraine. The events in Ukraine can be seen as a form of imperialist
politics that aims at regaining some of the ground lost by Russia since
the end of the Cold War. It is important to keep in mind that the
Russian sphere of influence has shrunk dramatically in the last quarter
of a century. In 1989, Russian forces were standing in East Germany.
Today, many former Warsaw Pact countries are members of NATO
and the EU. Therefore, some consider the efforts by the current
Russian government to be a form of pushback against the West after
having lost the Cold War. In some respects, however, Russia has
joined the rest of Europe. Russia is a European nation and, like almost
all European countries (notable exceptions are Belarus, Kosovo,49
Kazakhstan50), has become a member of the Council of Europe 51
(COE)52 and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights

48.

49.

50.

51.
52.

Alexey Eremenko, As Rebels Advance, Russia Is Accused of Sending Troops to
Ukraine, THE MOSCOW TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/as-rebels-advance-russia-is-accused-ofsending-troops-to-ukraine/506080.html.
Kosovo’s Path to the Council of Europe: Identifying Procedures, GROUP FOR LEGAL &
POL. STUD. (Sept. 2013), http://legalpoliticalstudies.org/2013/09/kosovos-path-to-thecouncil-of-europe-identifying-procedures-obstacles-and-solutions-for-membership-2/.
Hasan Kanbolat, Kazakhstan wants to take its place in Europe, TODAYS ZAMAN
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/hasan-kanbolat_167154kazakhstan-wants-to-take-its-place-in-europe.html.
MICHAEL HASS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS- A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION
274-275 (Routledge 2008) (On the Council of Europe).
The Vatican State is not a member of the Council of Europe either but it has to be kept
in mind that the Vatican state is a relatively new legal entity and that the Catholic
Church has traditionally been represented on the international stage by the Holy See.
While the Vatican State is a party to technical treaties concerning e.g.
Telecommunication or Postal Services, foreign affairs and human rights issues are
dealt with by the Holy See. While it is prevented from being a party to many
international treaties which are only open to states, the Holy See enjoys observer status
at many international organizations, including the Council of Europe. By seeking
observer status, the Holy See can express its support for the efforts of an organization,
even if is is unable to join. This, too, can be said for the Council of Europe’s work, in
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(ECHR).53 The European system of human rights protection54 has long
served to protect human rights by giving victims a place in
international law, but also allows states to invoke human rights vis-àvis other states who have ratified the Convention.55
II.

THE CASE OF UKRAINE V. RUSSIA BEFORE
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Application
On March 13, 2014, Ukraine brought a case against Russia before
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).56 The legal basis for
this inter-state case is Article 33 ECHR, to which both Ukraine and
Russia are parties.57 The relevant provision reads as follows:
Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged
breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto
by another High Contracting Party.58
The ECtHR, which is based in Strasbourg, France, is still dealing
with the case, and at the time of writing no decision has been made on
the material questions of the case. However, on the day of the
application, the Court issued interim measures.59

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.

particular in the fields of peaceful coexistence and cooperation in Europe as well as the
protection of human rights.
Press Country Profile: Russia, EUR. CT. H.R.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Russia_ENG.pdf (last updated Oct. 2014).
For an overview over the European human rights system, see Rhona K.M. Smith,
TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 96 et seq. (2014).
Id.
Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20158/14, EUR. CT. H.R., HUDOC (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.echr.coe.int.
Council of Europe, EUR. CONV. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
33.
Id.
Press Release, Registrar of the Court, EUR. CT. H.R., Interim Measures Granted in
Inter-State Case Brought by Ukraine Against Russia (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/003-4699472-5703982.
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B. Rights concerned
The application only relates to the situation in Crimea. Because
the application by Ukraine remains secret for the duration of the
proceedings, the exact details of Ukraine’s claims are unknown. There
are still some open questions surrounding the case. At this time “it
cannot be determined on which specific criteria the court based its
imposition of interim measures. [I]nterim measures are not published
with official court reasons [and] the Ukrainian Government’s
application entered under Article 33 of the ECHR is not yet accessible,
rendering it hard to give a prognosis regarding its chance of success.” 60
Also, “the question [has been raised] whether this might be a case of
“legal forum shopping” and if the [International Court of Justice]
might not have been”61 a more appropriate forum for what is essentially
an international conflict, which now has taken on a military dimension.
It appears likely that the case will show parallels to that of Georgia
v. Russia (II).62 This case is not to be confused with Georgia v. Russia
(I),63 which was brought before the ECtHR in 2007 and decided in the
summer of 2014, and which dealt with the expulsion of Georgian
citizens from Russia.64 Georgia v. Russia (II), on the other hand, deals
with events in the context of Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia 65
which led to the creation of two self-proclaimed but hardly recognized
would-be ‘states,’ South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This is a reminder that
Russia’s tactics of astro-turf-separatism is hardly new.

60.

61.
62.

63.
64.

65.

Frederike Kollmer, In the interim in Strasbourg re: the crisis in Crimea, in:
CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2014),
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/03/27/interim-strasbourg-re-crisis-crimea/.
Id.
See Philip Leach, Ukraine, Russia and Crimea in the European Court of Human
Rights, EJIL TALK! (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-russia-andcrimea-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights/.
Georgia v. Russia (I), App. No. 13255/07, EUR. CT. H.R. (June 30, 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145546.
Press Release, EUR. CT. H.R., Russia’s Policy in 2006 of Arresting, Detaining, and
Expelling Large Numbers of Georgian Nationals Violated the Convention (July 3,
2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-48115145865358.
Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, EUR. CT. H.R. (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108097.
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The inter-state case of Georgia v. Russia (II), which was held to
be admissible in 2011 and is still pending before the Court,66 has visible
parallels to the ongoing conflict. Georgia claimed “that, in the course
of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks by Russian forces and/
or by the separatist forces under their control, hundreds of civilians
were injured, killed, detained or went missing, thousands of civilians
had their property and homes destroyed and over 300,000 people were
forced to”67 flee. At the time of writing, the number of refugees in the
Ukraine crisis, according to estimates by Russian authorities and the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is more than one
million, most of whom have fled to Russia.68 In Georgia v. Russia (II),
Russia claimed that it did not have jurisdiction over the combat area69
and doubted the applicability of the ECHR to armed conflict.70
In addition to the examples of violations of Georgia’s territorial
integrity as well as the ‘republics’ in Crimea (including Sevastopol),
Donetsk and Luhansk, the case of Transnistria comes to mind. The
latter is a strip of land east of the Dniester river in Moldova, which
declared its independence shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. To
this day, Russian “peacekeepers” operate in Transnistria, and it is
claimed that many among the local population (as in South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, Donetsk and Luhansk) within the disputed territory wish to
become part of the Russian Federation. Should Russian forces conquer
the south of Ukraine, this territory would border Transnistria,
suggesting a wider Russian claim.
The referendum, which from a Russian perspective paved the way
for the breaking away of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine, has
already been viewed as illegal.71 Despite the illegality of conquest by
force,72 the Russian Federation has been in de facto control of Crimea
and Sevastopol since March. While an occupied state remains
responsible under the ECHR for human rights violations across its
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id., ¶ 20.
Georgia v. Russia, supra note 65.
Number of displaced inside Ukraine more than doubles since early August to 260,000,
UNHCR (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/540590ae9.html.
Leach, supra note 62.
Leach, supra note 62.
Brilmayer, supra note 1.
Brilmayer, supra note 1.
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territory,73 it will be shown that Russia has jurisdiction over Crimea
and Sevastopol within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.74 Jurisdiction
in this sense of the term, however, does not give Russia any legal title
to this territory but can only trigger Russia’s responsibility under the
ECHR.75
C. Decision of 13 March 2014
On the same day that Ukraine brought the case to the European
Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR granted the applicant interim relief
and ordered both State parties “to refrain from taking any measures, in
particular military actions, which might entail breaches of the
Convention rights of the civilian population, including putting their life
and health at risk, and to comply with their engagements under the
Convention, notably in respect of Articles 2 (right to life) and 3
(prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment).”76
The case raises three issues which need to be dealt with in more
detail: 1) how do inter-state cases before the ECtHR work and which
effect can they have;77 2) how is interim relief granted and
implemented in proceedings before the ECtHR, and can notions on
interim relief in Article 43 cases be transferred to interim relief issues
in Article 33 cases;78 and 3) which state is actually responsible for
human rights violations in Crimea and Sevastopol?79

73.

74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. OF
THE RED CROSS 317, 333-34(2012),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-885-lubell.pdf.
Council of Europe, EUR. CONV. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, art.
1.
See generally id.
Id. at art. 2.
Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/14, 073, EUR. CT. H.R. (2014).
See id.
See id.
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INTER-STATE CASES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The individual complaint procedure under Article 34 is the feature
of the ECHR which provides a real “[n]ovelty”80 in that it had not been
possible before for individuals to sue states on an international level.81
Today, individuals are significantly more important for international
law than they used to be in classical, Westphalian, international law.82
The procedure under Article 34 remains the crowning achievement of
this development.83 The inter-state procedure under Article 3384 on the
other hand, is a reminder that the ECHR, despite its nature as a selfcontained legal regime, which has taken international law to an entirely
new level, remains an international treaty between states.
Just as the states are the primary focus for the application of the
Convention and therefore have the primary responsibility for
compliance, the procedure under Article 33 ECHR is a reminder of the
states’ responsibilities.85 By virtue of Article 33, not only the European
Court of Human Rights, but all states which are parties to the
Convention have a “guardian function”86 with regard to the ECHR.
However, states are usually reluctant to sacrifice good political
relations for the purposes of human rights. Therefore, the inter-state
procedure under Art. 33 “has generally been used very sparingly.” 87
States which have ratified the ECHR have resorted to this instrument
only in rare and very serious cases. Examples of such cases include
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.

Stefan Kirchner, The Pre-Natal Personal Scope of Article 2 Section1 Sentence 1 of the
Eur. Convention on Human Rights, 6 LAW AND FORENSIC SCI. 94, 94 (2012).
Alastair Mowbray, The European Convention, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW- SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND 271, 288 (Mashood A. Baderin &
Manisuli Ssenyojo, eds., 2010).
Christopher C. Joyner, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY – RULES FOR
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 62 (2005).
ECHR, supra note 74 at art. 34
See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOLDMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 947-63 (3rd ed. 2008) (providing an overview on all the case law
on Article 33 ECHR cases).
Council of Europe, supra note 74 at art. 34
CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS –
COMMENTARY 8 (2014).
Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/14, 073, EUR. CT. H.R. (2014).
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the so called Greek Case88 during military rule, and mainly (but not
necessarily),89 those cases which involve violations of the human rights
of their own nationals by another state,90 such as in the case of
Denmark v. Turkey91 and Georgia v. Russia (I).92
The European Court of Human Rights is also no stranger to armed
conflicts, having ruled on the use of force with regard to military
operations in the former Yugoslavia,93 Chechnya,94 Turkey95 and Iraq.96
International Humanitarian Law and the ECHR are not mutually
exclusive,97 and the ECHR is also applicable in wartime, as evidenced
by the existence of rules in the Convention, which provide for the
possibility of derogations in wartime and similar situations.98 Indeed,
the European Court of Human Rights has already dealt with the
aftermath of armed conflicts, such as the invasion and continuing
occupation of a part of Cyprus by Turkey,99 or Russia’s 2008 war
against Georgia.100 The case brought before the Court by Ukraine only
refers to the situation in Crimea.

88.

Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands v. Greece, App. No. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67,
3344/67 Eur. Comm’n on H.R. (“The Greek Case,” 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
XII).
89. Cf. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86 at 48.
90. Cf. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86 at 48.
91. Cf. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86 at 48.
92. Leach, supra note 62.
93. Bankovic et. al. v. Belgium et. al., App. No. 52207/99, EUR. CT. H.R. (2001).
94. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, EUR. CT. H.R. (2005).
95. Mentes et. al v. Turkey, App. No. 58/1996/667/867, EUR. CT. H.R. (1997).
96. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, Information Note on the Court’s caselaw No. 164, 164 EUR. CT. H.R. (1997),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-7571.
97. UN Human Rights Committee, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 31, ¶ 11. U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add/13 (May 26, 2004), http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/419/56/PDF/G0441956.pdf?OpenElement.
98. Stefan Kirchner, Human Rights Guarantees during States of Emergency: The
European Convention on Human Rights, 3 BALTIC J. OF LAW AND POL. 2, 1 et seq.
(2010).
99. Frank Hoffmeister, Case note: Cyprus v. Turkey, 96 A.J.I.L. 445 et seq. (2002).
100. Leach, supra note 62.
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INTERIM RELIEF UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS101

Normally the European Court of Human Rights takes years to
conclude a case. This comes as no surprise because the forty-seven
judges are inundated with cases, and despite efforts to make it more
difficult to bring a case before the court with tightened admissibility
requirements, the Court still has a large backlog. Sometimes, though,
a case brought before the Court requires an immediate response. The
European Convention on Human Rights does not provide for such a
possibility.102 The Court has created procedural rules, the Rules of
Court (RoC).103 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows the Court to act
quickly,104 and to “indicate that a measure be taken in the interests of
the parties or the proper conduct of proceedings.”105 Usually, this
means protecting the applicant against impending state measures,
which could impact his or her rights to an extent that the exercise of
the human rights in question becomes difficult or impossible, or could
cause damage to the applicant during the course of the proceedings.
Typically, the applicant will be in a much weaker position than
the state, and while the Court will remain neutral towards the parties,
the structure of ECHR cases will often require the Court to stop the
state from behaving in a certain way, although interim measures can
be imposed on the applicant as well.106 In the following, we will first
look at interim measures in cases of individual applications under
Article 34, of which there are far more than in Article 33 cases, before

101. See generally R. St. J. MacDonald, Interim Measures in International Law with
Special Reference to the European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 52
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT
[HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L LAW] 703 (1992) (Ger.).
102. See generally, Council of Europe, supra note 74.
103. EUR. CT. H.R., RULES OF COURT (July 1, 2014),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf.
104. Id. at Rule 39.
105. KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 9 (2007); EUR. CT. H.R., supra note 103 at Rule 39.
106. KAREN REID, supra note 105 at 21.
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dealing with the question of the transferability of notions developed by
the Court in individual complaints to inter-state cases.107
In Article 34 cases, the respondent state is considered to have
violated the right to individual petition, which is inherent in Article 34,
if it fails to comply with interim measures.108 While interim measures
are not included in the Convention, Rule 39 RoC is used to interpret
Article 34. Because the Convention is based on the idea of effective
protection of human rights,109 the possibility to bring a case before the
Court under Article 34 is not just the result of a procedural rule, but
actually a right under the Convention, and compliance with Article 34
requires states to take measures aimed at safeguarding the human
rights in relation to which a complaint has been lodged under Article
34. This necessarily includes compliance with interim measures
ordered by the court.
In order to enforce judgments, the European human rights system
relies on the Council of Europe’s Council of Ministers.110 As far as
compliance with interim measures is concerned “the Court [. . .] relies
on the good will and co-operation of the Contracting States.”111
Therefore the Court will only take interim measures if there is a
“pressing reason”112 to take urgent action in order to safeguard human
rights; “it is only in cases of extreme urgency that interim measures are
indicated: the fact must prima facie point [to] a violation of the
Convention, and the omission to take the proposed measures must
result or threaten to result in irreparable injury to certain vital interests
of the parties or to the progress of the examination.”113 To highlight
107. Council of Europe, supra note 74 at art. 34.
108. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R.
(2005); Council of Europe, supra note 74 at art. 34; REID, supra note 105 at 19.
109. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R.,
(2005).
110. Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/Pres_Exec_en.asp.
111. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R.,
(2005); REID, supra note 105, at 19.
112. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R.,
(2005); REID, supra note 105, at 19.
113. PIETER VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (Leo Zwaak ed., 4th ed. 2006).
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how restrictively the Court has used Rule 39 RoC, it is noteworthy that
not even detention issues are thought to normally require such
measures.114
If interim measures are ordered, the respondent government is
informed at once and the case is fast-tracked “for review at an early
opportunity. If the request is refused, the case may nonetheless proceed
for examination on admissibility and merits in the normal manner.”115
The review is necessary because the application of Rule 39 RoC
requires a risk to human rights.116 If that risk no longer exists, the
interim measures will not be continued, as the reason for the
application no longer exists.117 “The Court’s competence to issue
interim measures is not granted by the ECHR itself, but governed by
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which the High Contracting Parties do
not submit themselves to, but which are adopted by the Court itself in
accordance with Article 25 literal “d” of the ECHR.”118
The Rules of Court were not agreed upon by the states’ parties to
the ECHR directly, but were created by the ECtHR on the behalf of the
ECHR and therefore are considered to be “derived consensual law. . .
[T]he ECHR initially negated a binding effect of interim measures
even after Protocol no. 11 came into effect.”119 In Cruz Varas v.
Sweden120 the ECtHR “had to decide on the argument that the failure
to comply with the Commission’s indication of an interim measure
amounted to a violation of Sweden’s obligation under Article 25 (the
present Article 34) not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of
individual petition.”121 It held that this was not the case,122 but that the
Court had to rely on the “good faith co-operation”123 of states. This
view, however, was not to last.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

REID, supra note 105, at 20.
See EUR. CT. H.R., supra note 103.
EUR. CT. H.R., supra note 103 at Rule 39.
REID, supra note 105, at 21.
Kollmer, supra note 60.
Kollmer, supra note 60.
Cruz Varas et.al. v. Sweden, App. No. 15576/89, EUR. CT. H.R. (1991).
VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 113, at 110.
Cruz Varas v. Sweden, supra note 120, ¶ 94-105.
VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 113, at 110.
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In Mamatkulov and Adburasulovic v. Turkey124 as well as in the
first Öcalan case, Öcalan v. Turkey,125 the Court decided that interim
measures under Rule 39 RoC are indeed legally binding. 126 Noncompliance with an interim measure “can lead to a violation of the
right of individual application (under Article 34 ECHR), at least if the
contested act . . . has effected the core of the right of individual
application.’’127 Since Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey the ECtHR
considers them to be binding.128 The ECtHR has “[f]ollow[ed] the
“trend” set by the ICJ in the LaGrand case,”129 but then went far beyond
it by expanding the definition of what is required by states in order to
avoid running afoul of the Convention. In the case of Olaechea
Cahuas v. Spain, the court ruled that:
[N]on-compliance with the interim measures per se would result
in a breach of the Convention. It assumed this to be the case, regardless
of the fact that non-compliance with an interim measure did not lead,
post facto, to an infringement of the right to application in accordance
with Article 34 of the ECHR. The Court confirmed this assumption in
the case of Mostafa et al. v. Turkey. Thereby it elevates – and this is
quite remarkable – a simple regulatory rule to the status of a
Convention right, by linking Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, directly to
Article 34 of the ECHR. The court’s argument here again is one of
efficiency.130
At the end of the day, states are more likely than not to comply
with interim measures imposed by the ECtHR.131 The rules on interim
measures apply equally if the application is lodged under Article 34 or
under Article 33 of the ECHR.132

124. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R.
(2005).
125. Öcalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99, EUR. CT. H.R. (2005).
126. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99 ¶ 129, EUR. CT.
H.R. (2005).; Öcalan v. Turkey, App. No. 46221/99 ¶ 170, EUR. CT. H.R. (2005).
127. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 113, at 110.
128. Kollmer, supra note 60.
129. Kollmer, supra note 60.
130. Kollmer, supra note 60; citing Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, App. No. 24668/03, EUR.
CT. H.R. (2006); Mostafa et. al. v. Turkey, App. No. 16348/05 EUR. CT. H.R. (2008).
131. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 113, at 113.
132. Kollmer, supra note 60.
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JURISDICTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FOR EVENTS ON CRIMEA

The Court’s decision on interim relief does not answer the
question of whether Russia will be held accountable for human rights
violations happening in Ukraine. As a general rule, a state is
responsible for human rights violations in its territory. The annexation
of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation was illegal under
international law. Yet, neither from Russia’s claim to these territories
nor from the illegality of the annexation can we draw any final
conclusions with regard to Russia’s responsibility concerning the
Crimean peninsula. The decisive question is if Russia has jurisdiction
within the meaning of Art. 1 ECHR, which requires that the state in
question “actually exercises effective overall control over a certain
area.”133 It does not matter how this control is organized; “[t]his
control may either be exercised directly, through armed forces, [which
might very well be the case by now] or through a subordinate local
administration.”134
In cases in which the area in question is part of the territory of a
state that has also ratified ECHR, the Court is more willing to hold the
interfering state accountable.135 The Court has held states that have
ratified the ECHR to be responsible under the Convention for human
rights violations abroad. It has done so both in cases in which the
human rights violation happened in another COE member state, and in
cases in which it did not. “Where the territory of one Convention state
is occupied by the armed forces of another, the occupying state should
in principle be held accountable under the Convention for breaches of
human rights within the occupied territory, because to hold otherwise
would be to deprive the population of that territory of the rights and
freedoms they would have enjoyed.”136

133. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86, at 8.
134. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86, at 8; Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89,
Preliminary Objections, EUR. CT. H.R. (1995).
135. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86, at 9.
136. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86, at 9; see Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89,
Preliminary Objections, EUR. CT. H.R. (1995); Bankovic et .al. v. Belgium et. al., App.
No. 52207/99, EUR. CT. H.R. (2001).
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This kind of jurisdiction beyond a state’s borders is not the only
way for Ukraine to bring Russia to court. While the ECHR is usually
perceived through the lens of the individual complaint procedure under
Art. 34 ECHR, and constitutes a self-contained regime, the ECHR
remains an international treaty. A violation of the ECHR by any state
is not only a violation of human rights but a violation of international
law obligations to all other parties to the ECHR. While inter-state
cases are rare when compared to individual applications, inter-state
complaints are the regular way in which the ECHR is given force as an
international treaty (while individual applications fulfill this function
for the ECHR as a human rights treaty.) Inter-state cases not only serve
the interests of states but the protection of European Human rights law.
By bringing the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human
Rights, Ukraine not only defended its own interests and the rights of
its citizens and residents, but also the ECHR.
Article 1 ECHR refers to the factual exercise of jurisdiction.137
Under general international law, Crimea and Sevastopol are still part
of Ukraine. Ukraine therefore has legal title to the disputed territory
but cannot exercise jurisdiction due to the occupation by Russia. This
does not mean that Ukraine does not have any responsibility with
regard to what happens in its territory. One way in which Ukraine can
live up to its responsibilities under the ECHR is to demand the de facto
power, Russia, to respect human rights. Ukraine has done so by
bringing the case before the European Court of Human Rights under
Article 33.138 It would be well advised to expand the case to include
the ongoing situation in the East and South-East of the country as well.
Russia occupies the territory and exercises jurisdiction there even
without having title to the territory. From the moment Russia
effectively controlled Crimea and Sevastopol, the Russian Federation
had jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.139 Given that
Russian covert operatives and later overt Russian armed forces played
a role in the breakaway of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia exercised
jurisdiction at least over parts of the peninsula before incorporating
Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. Even if the self137. Council of Europe, supra note 74, at art 1.
138. Council of Europe, supra note 74, at art 33.
139. Council of Europe, supra note 74, at art 1.
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declared Republic of Crimea were a state (which it is not due to the
collective non-recognition by the international community),140 though
it is not a party to the ECHR, the Convention would still have a residual
effect.141
In the conflict with Ukraine, Russia has claimed a need to deploy
forces across the border in order to protect Russian-speaking persons
who live in Ukraine,142 essentially considering them to be ethnic
Russians. While the protection of nationals abroad has long been a
sensitive topic in international relations,143 Russia’s claim seems to
extend to persons of Russian ethnicity who are not necessarily citizens
of the Russian Federation. This claim is not only troubling for states
with large Russian speaking populations, such as Latvia,144
Kazakhstan,145 or Estonia,146 but is also a departure from international
law in this regard. It cannot be ruled out, however, that Russia gives
citizenship of the Russian Federation to ethnic Russians who live
abroad, thereby instantaneously creating a link between the Russian
state and foreign residents.147 While Crimea’s declaration of
140. See JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 96, 97 (Juta
& Co, Ltd , 4th ed. 2011); JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 11
(Grotius Publications Ltd., 1987).
141. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86.
142. Putin: Russian Citizens, Troops Threatened in Ukraine, Need Armed Forces’
Protection, RT ONLINE (Mar. 1, 2014), http://rt.com/news/russia-troops-ukrainepossible-359/.
143. Sina Etezazian, Ukraine Insta-Symposium: The Crisis in Crimea – The Protection of
Nationals Abroad and the Legality of Ukraine’s Possible Use of Force in Self-Defense,
OPINION JURIS BLOG (Mar. 9, 2014, 9:30 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/09/ukraine-insta-symposium-crisis-crimea-protectionnationals-abroad-legality-ukraines-possible-use-force-self-defense/.
144. Ian Traynor, Kazakhstan is Latest Russian Neighbour to Feel Putin’s Chilly
Nationalist Rhetoric, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/01/kazakhstan-russian-neighbour-putinchilly-nationalist-rhetoric.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. This occurred in the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
2008. Vincent M. Artman, Annexation by Passport, AL-JAZEERA AMERICA (Mar. 14,
2012), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/ukraine-russiacrimeapassportizationcitizenship.html; Kristopher Natoli, Weaponizing Nationality:
An Analysis of Russia’s Passport Policy in Georgia, 28 B.U. INT’L L.J. 389 (2010),
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/ukraine-russiacrimeapassportizationcitizenship.html.
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independence, and consequently Russia’s annexation of Crimea, is
incompatible with international law, the Russian government also
claimed that there was a need to intervene in Crimea in order to protect
the ethnic Russians who are living there.148 This makes it necessary to
understand how international law in general addresses the protection
of a state’s own nationals who live abroad.
In general, states have a right to protect their nationals abroad.
Usually this happens through normal diplomatic and consular
channels. In extreme cases, states may use a limited amount of force
to protect nationals abroad, for example by deploying military assets
to evacuate nationals from crisis areas. This right is of course restricted
to nationals and, in exceptional cases, nationals of other states, if said
third states have consented to such an action.149 While the target
country will usually be asked for its consent, this will not always be
possible, and in urgent cases the rescuing state will be able to invoke
the doctrine of necessity for this purpose.150 These rescue operations
in extreme circumstances are considered legal under customary
international law, in particular because they do not amount to an illegal
armed attack against the country concerned.
In the case of Crimea, there was no concrete danger to Russians
in Crimea, only an abstract possibility that the new leadership in Kyiv
might not be as positively positioned towards ethnic Russians as the
last government. Specific human rights violations by the new
government against ethnic Russians have not been made public.
Therefore, there was no need for Russian military intervention, let
alone one of such wide scope as to take over Crimea – not to mention
the later annexation of the peninsula. Russia may claim that the
persons in question were ethnic Russians, and indeed, Russia had
already been handing out passports to inhabitants of the Crimea
peninsula prior to the annexation.151 This mirrors Russia’s behavior in
the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in

148.
149.
150.
151.

Traynor, supra note 144.
Etezazian, supra note 143.
Etezazian, supra note 143.
Russia Issuing Passports in Crimea; Ukraine Introducing Visas for Russians, RFE/RL
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-russiapassports/25303107.html.
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2008.152 While doing so might not be illegal per se, Russia would have
to comply with the test laid down in Nottebohm,153 which requires a
genuine link between the state and the individual.154
Ethnicity could be sufficient to establish such a link. Even if we
assume that ethnic Russians or a number of Russian citizens had been
at risk, this would not have justified the outright annexation of Crimea.
At most, Russia would have been allowed to take measures to protect
her citizens. As not even the Quebéc155 requirements for independence
were met, the annexation was incompatible with international law as
well. By annexing Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia has also violated
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The intervention by the Russian
Federation is incompatible with international law and cannot be
justified by recourse to the notion of the protection of citizens who
reside abroad. From the perspective of Article 1, however, it appears
clear that Russia exercises jurisdiction in Crimea and Sevastopol and
has every intention to do so in the future.156
VI.

OUTLOOK

At the time of writing in late August 2014, the case between
Ukraine and the Russian Federation is still pending before the
European Court of Human Rights and the situation continues to
develop, in particular in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Ukraine
where fighting has become significantly more intense during the final
week of August.157 The documents submitted by the parties will only
be made public after the conclusion of the case by the Court. Until
then, press releases by the European Court of Human Rights will form
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the most reliable official source of information on this case. However,
it is possible to put this case into perspective against the background
of both the European Convention on Human Rights and earlier interstate cases brought against Russia before the European Court of
Human Rights.
In December 2014, Ukraine decided to end its non-aligned status
and it is now pursuing NATO membership158 but while membership in
the Western alliance remains unlikely in light of the ongoing dispute
with Russia, Ukraine might be well advised to follow the Finnish
example and serve as a neutral state and a gateway between Western
Europe and Russia, 159 albeit with close ties to the West (Finland is a
member of the EU and cooperates with NATO on some security
issues.)160 As the flame of freedom has been carried eastward in the
20th century, it has to be the long-term goal of Europe to fully integrate
Russia into the European family of nations. An important step in this
direction has been Russia’s ratification of the European Convention on
Human Rights.161 Recent measures taken by Russian authorities to
quell dissent and to limit peace demonstrations, as well as reports of
human rights violations against religious minorities and journalists in
Crimea, however, indicate that this, too, remains a significant
challenge.
This challenge is increased by the apparently growing focus of
Russian authorities on self-reliance and isolation. A Russian
Federation which is isolated will not only be harder to integrate into
the European legal system, but is also more likely to allow violations
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such violations,
systematic human rights violations in particular (as seen in Crimea),
will need an effective response from other European nations, as well
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as from Europe’s human rights institutions. The interim measure
issued by the European Court of Human Rights on March 13, 2014162
is an important step in the right direction. It remains to be seen if
Russia will comply with this ruling. While the Court has made it clear
that interim measures are binding,163 “there has been a perceptible
increase in the rate of states’ non-compliance with rule 39 in recent
years.”164
In 1988, the year Mikhail Gorkachev argued for human rights to
play a role in the legal system of the USSR,165 the first law school in
the Soviet Union opened a department dedicated to human rights. 166
Today’s Russia might have abandoned communism but it can be seen
in a tradition of Russian attempts to gain geopolitical features, or in
other words, an empire. During the occupation of East Germany after
World War II, the Soviet Union installed ‘‘judges’’ who were loyal
adherents of Soviet ideology but lacked all legal training.167 It has to
be feared that Russian’s puppet ‘states’ will act similarly in the parts
of Ukraine now under Russian control.
The declaration of independence of the self-proclaimed Republic
of Crimea was incompatible with international law,168 as is Russia’s
continued intervention in Ukraine. Both the European Union169 and
the Council of Europe170 are committed “to secure peace and prosperity
in Europe and to achieve an ever closer union among its peoples.”171
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The current Russian government seems to have abandoned this ideal,
raising the question whether Russia would comply with an eventual
judgment by the European Court of Human Rights. This would
seriously undermine the position of the Court, which, so far, has
enjoyed a very high rate of compliance with its judgments. 172 The
ongoing occupation of the Crimean peninsula shows disrespect for the
Court, and the continued fighting in other parts of Ukraine shows a
lack of respect for the spirit of the Convention. While the Convention
also applies in times of war,173 the use of force, especially against
civilians, contradicts the goals of the Convention.
After the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union/ the Russian
Federation became a much weaker state.174 It appears that the current
Russian government seems to seek power through both direct and
indirect armed force. When Russia joined the Council of Europe in
1996, and subsequently a party to the ECHR,175 Russia’s legal system
did not meet the standards required by the Council of Europe.176 The
ECHR serves not only the protection of human rights but also of
democratic principles.177 By suing Russia in Strasbourg, Ukraine can
also make a case for the continued preservation of democratic ideals in
Eastern Ukraine. Outside efforts to ensure respect for human rights in
Crimea and the other parts of Ukraine, which are affected by the
current conflict, should not be seen by either side as a form of
opposition to Russia, but as support for the Russian people’s demand
for freedom.
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